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The publication of "Freedom of Religion, Minorities and the Law" comes at an opportune 
time. In the middle years of the second half of the twentieth century many would have 
assumed that religion would play an ever decreasing role in our modern, technologically 
advanced British society. Recent years, however, have witnessed a marked increase in cases 
in which disputes concerning religion have been brought before the courts.1 
The reasons for the increase in such disputes are complex, but the juxtaposition of the terms 
"Freedom of Religion" "Minorities" and "Law" in the title of this book is surely significant in 
this regard, for it is a virtual truism that it is only when religious practices are exercised by 
minorities that the law becomes involved at all. Legal disputes with religion at their centre 
were comparatively rare in the U K in the early decades of the twentieth century when there 
existed a general broadly Christian consensus. But increasing immigration in the second half 
of the twentieth and early years of the twenty first centuries has increased the number of those 
minorities with religious beliefs different to those of the majority; it has resulted in Britain 
becoming a much more religiously diverse place. 
Conflicts involving law and religion tend to occur when the religious practices of minorities 
are perceived to be at odds with those of the secular or moderately Christian majority 
consensus as embodied in society's legal rules. In the modern democratic state it is really 
only for minorities, those dissenting from the main stream, that religious freedom assumes 
importance, for it is only their religious practices that tend to rub up against long standing 
legal and societal norms and conventions. The author quotes the philosopher and 
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revolutionary Rosa Luxembourg, writing in a different context: "[fjreedom always means 
freedom for the dissenters."11 
There is of course a further reason why religious conflicts are far more frequently being 
played out in the UK's courts in the early years of the twenty first century: the incorporation 
by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) ; the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.111 Whereas before 
protection for the right to freedom of religion did not exist - there was just the freedom 
simpliciter - now there exists a positively expressed right. This, as the author notes in her 
preface "marks a fundamental change in English law and its protection of civil liberties".1V 
Post H R A any interference with a person's manifestation of their religion or belief has to be 
in accordance with the strictures laid down in the second paragraph of Article 9. Most 
importantly it must not be disproportionate to the aim sought to be achieved (for example the 
protection of health or morals or the rights of others). The H R A has provided the main legal 
avenue via which the claims emanating from the societal tensions briefly touched on above 
have been brought to the courts. 
Furthermore, this is an area which is unusually subject to strange and paradoxical 
sensitivities. For within minority religious groups there may be others, not least women and 
children, whose interests may be perceived to run counter to the dominant religious beliefs of 
the group (or at least its leaders). Take for example the children of members of certain 
Christian groups who believe that "to spare the rod is to spoil the child"/ the Muslim woman 
who is required to wear the hijab upon entering a public space, or Jewish boys circumcised as 
infants. As the author says "[wjhilst sensitivity to religious and cultural difference is 
important, it should not be used as a means of undermining the rights of the vulnerable and 
the weak".vl Yet there is a further twist still, for often it is the supposed "vulnerable and 
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weak" individuals, those apparent victims of oppressive religious doctrine, who actually bring 
the claims themselves.™ 
In the preface the author notes that in determining the level of legal protection to be 
afforded to religion difficult questions are raised about "how a liberal democracy should 
balance the interests of the individual or group against the interests of the modern state, the 
extent to which the state will intervene in the affairs of religious organisations, and about the 
politics of assimilation and multiculturalism"vul It is against this complex background with its 
swirling undercurrents of politics, philosophy, culture and history that the author sets out her 
aim: 
"to provide a bridge between some of the underlying issues that feature in academic 
writing, and the practice of law. [The book] is intended as a user-friendly guide for 
practitioners, while at the same time placing these issues in context".1X 
This is no easy bridge to build - to give both a meaningful flavour of the swirling 
undercurrents themselves whilst at the same time providing a workable "black letter" guide to 
the law for those litigating these claims before the courts. In trying to achieve two separate, 
and in their own right ambitious aims, there is a danger that such a work will fall short of 
both. 
However in this reviewer's opinion the author has emphatically succeeded in her aim and 
avoided these potential traps. The first three chapters of the book deal largely with the above-
mentioned undercurrents whilst the remaining chapters deal with specific areas in which 
conflict has arisen whilst keeping an eye on the context. 
Chapter 1, "Context and Background", provides an elegant and pithy account of the 
historical and political factors that have led to the current religiously diverse population. It 
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then goes on to consider some of the political and philosophical underpinnings of religious 
freedom and multiculturalism. Finally the relationship between religion and the state is 
examined, with particular reference to the status of the established Church of England. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the main relevant domestic law: the common law, the Race 
Relations Act 1976, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2006 as well as EC 
Directives and other European instruments. There follows a comprehensive section on Article 
9 ECHR: when the right is engaged, and when limitations may justifiably be imposed on the 
manifestation or religion or belief. There is an up to date summary of the case law including 
recent domestic decisions such as Williamson, Begum and Copsey.x There follows a section 
on the provisions relating to discrimination - in particular Article 14 ECHR. Chapter 3 
examines the issue of how to balance conflicting rights and interests - perhaps the central 
issue in all human rights adjudication. It considers, specifically, possible tensions between the 
religious freedom of the individual and that of the religious group, the rights of the child and 
those of the parent, and the rights of the majority versus those of the minority. The remaining 
four chapters deal, in detail and depth with the civil law in several specific areas: education, 
employment, immigration and asylum, health and safety, animal rights, planning and prison 
law. These chapters provide an excellent guide to what are sometimes complex legal regimes. 
One of the issues which has been controversial in the recent case law is when exactly there 
is considered to be an interference with manifestation of religious belief so as to require a 
justification under Article 9(2). There have been a series of employment cases in which 
employee's religious beliefs have come into conflict with the terms of his or her employment, 
ending in dismissal. In such cases the courts have held there to be no interference with Article 
9 rights (since the employee is free to seek employment elsewhere) thus precluding any need 
to examine justifications under Article 9(2). 
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The author is critical of this approach. She tellingly compares the approach to cases 
involving other rights in which the courts have been much less willing to accept that existence 
of potential alternative employment.53 For example in the field of Article 8, the right to respect 
for a private life, dismissal from employment on the grounds of sexual orientation has been 
found to be an interference, notwithstanding the existence of alternative employment 
opportunities.™ She comments that "while it is plain that certain professions . . . may require 
religious beliefs to be subjugated to the needs of the job . . . it would be preferable to 
recognise the interference and deal with it on the basis of justification".XU1 
The author is also critical of the ease with which this logic has been transplanted into the 
field of education. In Begum, the House of Lords, relying on the employment case-law, held 
that the refusal by a state school to allow a female pupil to wear a,jilbab (long Islamic cloak) 
did not constitute an interference with her Article 9 rights since she could have attended 
another school which would have permitted such attire.^ As the author notes "it is 
questionable whether the provision of state funded education can be so readily aligned with 
the situation of private employers".™ 
Perhaps one area which bears heavily on the protection of religious rights, and on which this 
reviewer would have liked to see a little more critical comment is the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. Under this international law doctrine latitude is given to states by the Strasbourg 
court on the basis, partly, that there exists no consensus in Europe on questions of religion. 
There are hints in recent case law on religion that the doctrine will find its surrogate in the 
UK.™ Of course, as noted at the beginning of this review, it is usually only when the 
consensus, the majority view, is departed from, (axiomatically by minorities) that legal rights 
need to be invoked at all. There is a certain irony in the fact the margin of appreciation is 
invoked because of an absence of consensus, when it is this very absence (and the presence of 
diversity) that renders the right to freedom of religion and belief of such importance. 
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This is perhaps a carping criticism however. For this is an excellent book which 
successfully achieves the difficult tasks it sets itself, bridging the gap between the contextual 
academic and practitioner text without losing sight of either, and achieving the strengths of 
both. It deserves to be read not just by practitioners, but also by academics, students and all 
those with an interest in this, one of the big questions of the age. 
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